

Resolution A.872(20)

*Adopted on 27 November 1997
(Agenda item 13)*

**GUIDELINES FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF THE SMUGGLING OF
DRUGS, PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES AND PRECURSOR CHEMICALS ON SHIPS
ENGAGED IN INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRAFFIC**

THE ASSEMBLY,

HAVING CONSIDERED the general purpose of the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 1965, as amended, and in particular article III thereof,

RECALLING that the Facilitation Committee, conscious of the scourge of illicit drug trafficking, approved, at its seventeenth session in 1987, FAL.5/Circ.1/Rev.1 entitled 'Prevention of drug smuggling on ships engaged in international traffic - Guidelines for use by shipowners, seafarers and others closely involved with the operation of ships',

RECALLING FURTHER that, at its nineteenth regular session, it urged the Facilitation Committee to accelerate its work on the revision of the above Guidelines, which should also include measures to combat illicit trafficking in precursor materials,

RECOGNIZING the urgent need for international co-operation to suppress illicit traffic by sea as envisaged by the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic substances,

RECOGNIZING FURTHER the relevant rights and obligations contained in the international law of the sea, including the principle of freedom of navigation and the right of innocent passage,

BEING CONCERNED that illicit drug trafficking and transport of precursor materials seriously affect legitimate maritime transport,

NOTING WITH SATISFACTION the preparation of guidelines aiming at preventing and suppressing the unlawful acts which are addressed in the present resolution, developed by Member Governments and international organizations concerned,

ACKNOWLEDGING with appreciation the valuable contribution made by the ICS through its publication *Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse: Guidelines for owners and masters on prevention, detection and recognition*, on which a considerable part of the annex to the present resolution has been based,

1. ADOPTS the Guidelines for the Prevention and Suppression of the Smuggling of Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursor Chemicals on Ships Engaged in International Maritime Traffic, set out in the annex to the present resolution;
2. URGES Member Governments to implement the annexed Guidelines without delay, in accordance with the international law of the sea, and to bring them to the attention of harbour masters, shipping companies, shipowners, ship operators, shipmasters and all other parties concerned;
3. REQUESTS the Facilitation Committee to keep the Guidelines under continuous review and to update them, as appropriate, in the light of experience gained;
4. REVOKES FAL.5/Circ.1/Rev.1.

Annex

GUIDELINES FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF THE SMUGGLING OF DRUGS, PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES AND PRECURSOR CHEMICALS ON SHIPS ENGAGED IN INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRAFFIC

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PREAMBLE

1 These Guidelines contain general advice which may provide guidance to shipowners, seafarers and others closely involved with the operation of ships. They are standards whose aim is to assist shipping companies, ships' masters and officers in combating illicit drug trafficking and to recognize some of the symptoms of drug dependence among members of the crew. Based on these standards, shipowners may wish to examine the possibility of adopting or improving procedures aimed at preventing breaches of customs regulations in their ships, especially smuggling of illicit narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and chemical products essential for drug manufacture. Such procedures will necessarily vary from one ship to another, depending on the routes they serve.

2 The International Maritime Organization agreed to contribute to the international effort aimed at combating illicit drug trafficking more effectively and the Facilitation Committee, at its seventeenth session in September 1987, prepared guidelines on the prevention of drug smuggling on ships engaged in international traffic which were approved by the Council at its fourteenth extraordinary session in November 1987. The following guidelines replace the interim guidelines issued in document FAL.5/Circ.1, of 5 February 1987.

3 In certain cases a lack of concern or due diligence on the part of the master and crew may make vessels vulnerable to narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances or precursor chemicals being secreted aboard.

4 A high proportion of drug trafficking is undertaken by sea because of the opportunities offered by the large volume of shipping movements from producing to consuming countries as drug-traffickers attempt to enter the most profitable illicit markets. Once a drug consignment has entered a region, drug traffickers and their agents have little difficulty in moving it within that area, taking advantage of the wish of Governments to facilitate the movement of persons and goods across frontiers.

5 Three principal factors should be borne in mind when considering the implications of illicit drug trafficking for commercial means of transport:

- (i) The very high value of drugs when smuggled in large quantities has attracted the major international criminal organizations and terrorist groups. The possibility of violent incidents, including armed assault, on discovering any sizeable quantity of drugs should not be overlooked and, consequently, due precautions should always be taken.
- (ii) The professional trafficker rarely carries the drugs himself and usually finds an accomplice to do so. Merchant seamen are frequently targeted by drug traffickers anxious to get their products from producing to consuming countries. Often the seafarers are not fully aware of the risks involved, which include long prison sentences and, in some countries, the death penalty.
- (iii) There are no 'safe' shipping routes where operators can be quite certain that there are no illicit substances on their ships. Direct sailings from countries of supply to countries of consumption are clearly considered as a risk and receive special attention from customs authorities. However, increasing quantities of drugs are being moved by roundabout and circuitous routes, using ports in countries which are not drug producers which drug traffickers believe invite less risk of interception in countries of destination.

6 Shipping is vulnerable to drug trafficking on two fronts. First, the threat of drugs being concealed on vessels means that law-enforcement efforts by customs authorities may result in long delays to the departure of ships, especially cargo ships. Secondly, the possible involvement of crew members in drug abuse threatens the safety of the vessel.

CHAPTER 1 – PREVENTION OF ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING

1 CUSTOMS PROCEDURES

1.1 *Action by customs officers*

Customs officers have certain duties to fulfill in respect to all vessels arriving from and departing for foreign countries and normally seek to establish friendly co-operation with ships' officers and crews. They are trained to respect the ship as the seafarer's home, and recognize that crew members wish to do their work without interference and without shipboard life being disturbed more than necessary.

Customs are grateful for any co-operation and information that any crew member can provide to eliminate drug trafficking. Information provided will be treated in the strictest confidence and will be investigated without delay.

Some customs services or other competent authorities of the coastal State are empowered by law to board without the permission of the flag State any ships not entitled to sovereign immunity within their ports or passing through the territorial sea and remain there, inspect and examine any part and open any closed place or container suspected of concealing contraband whether or not keys are available. Some authorities may also be empowered to exercise, in the contiguous zone, the control necessary to prevent, *inter alia*, infringement of the coastal States customs, laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea. Such procedures vary according to the legislation in different countries. Customs services or other competent authorities of the coastal State may also be empowered to board and search foreign flag suspect ships located seaward of the territorial sea/contiguous zone with the permission of the flag State.

Questions asked about possible actions by customs officers in relation to the ship include the following:

Can customs officers board the vessel?

Most national legislation provides that any customs officer or other duly authorized person may board the ship at any time while it is within the limits of a port or within territorial waters.

Can customs officers search the ship?

Most national legislation allows customs officers to search any part of the ship. They are also permitted, by law, to remain on the ship for the purposes of the necessary searches. There may be certain areas of the vessel (inert cargo spaces, sensitive electronic equipment, etc.) where they will need advice, crew assistance, special clothing or equipment to conduct a search. Customs officers should be informed of such areas on boarding.

Can ships on which illicit drugs are found be seized by customs officers?

Under certain national legislation, some ships used to carry goods subject to seizure may also be seized under customs legislation. Sanctions may be imposed on a vessel whose responsible officers (i.e. the master, officers and engineers, manager or owner of a vessel) are involved, either through their acts or through failure to take reasonable precautions to avoid any member of the crew under their supervision engaging in illicit drug trafficking.

Do customs officers have to be provided with accommodation on the ship?

Generally the law allows the customs authority to station officers in any ship while it is within the limits of a port or within territorial waters, always provided that the specific situation does not constitute a threat to the personal safety of the crew, customs or investigating officers.

Does a proper gangway have to be provided for access to the vessel?

Most legislation requires customs officers to be provided with safe means of access to and exit from the vessel. Customs officers' requirements must be complied with immediately, provided that they are reasonable in the circumstances.

What power does the customs officer have when searching a vessel?

The law generally permits the customs officer to have free access to every part of the ship and its cargo. Additionally he may:

- .1 mark, or cause to be marked, any goods before loading;
- .2 lock up, seal, mark or secure any goods carried in the ship, or in any place, or in any container;
- .3 break open any place or container which is locked if the keys are withheld or otherwise unavailable.

Customs officers generally have authority to:

- .1 board or search ships when these actions are necessary to suppress illicit trafficking by sea;
- .2 arrest any offender and may impose sanctions or fines, and order arrest, unless otherwise laid down in the legislation of the country.

When, during the search of a ship, the customs authorities discover illicit substances, the responsible officer may be held accountable.

When customs officers take legal proceedings, the master and other responsible parties may be held criminally liable, as appropriate under national law.

1.2 Information about the crew

Customs officers may regard the following persons as "responsible ships' officers":

- .1 masters;
- .2 mates, including those without certificates;
- .3 engineers, including those without certificates;
- .4 refrigeration engineers;
- .5 pursers and certified chief petty officers on passenger ships.

Ships' masters may be asked to comply with any reasonable request by the Customs for important information which may be available concerning one or more individual crew members. Although there may be criminal liability, co-operation and the value of the information supplied by the master may be mitigating factors with regard to the ship's liability.

On the arrival of the vessel, customs officers should, where practicable, be notified of the fact that one or more crew members have left or joined the ship in that port.

Except in exceptional circumstances, customs officers should be provided with any information on the cargo and the crew before the ship's arrival.

THE POWERS OF CUSTOMS OFFICERS ARE BROAD, BUT IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD THEY BE ABUSED. ANY INSTANCE OF LACK OF INTEGRITY ON THE PART OF SUCH OFFICERS ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD SHOULD BE REPORTED TO THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND THE FLAG STATES.

On request, most customs authorities will advise shipowners and masters of high-risk ports. Customs authorities should designate specific contact points in ports for reporting drug-related incidents.

1.3 Action by shipping companies

Whenever practicable, shipping companies should be prepared to assist Customs in suitable training on methods of searching the type of ships operated by the company.

Details, including drawings, of any recent structural repair, major remodelling or refit of the vessel (interior or exterior) should be kept on board in case they are required by the customs authorities.

Shipping companies should normally allow customs authorities access to commercial information on ships and their cargo, especially changes of destination, consignee, etc.

Shipping companies should assist in training customs officers on the use of container routes, cargo and information systems or provide customs authorities with appropriate access to such systems.

1.4 Cargo security

Shipping companies should request customs authorities for assistance in providing information and expert advice to their staff responsible for security, cargo handling and documentation, in order to train them to recognize and report cases where the circumstances are suspicious, such as discrepancies in weight, losses, inconsistencies in payments, make-up of bales, route, anomalies in documentation or any other inconsistency.

When there is a numerical list of all containers to be unloaded in a port, the shipping company's responsible officer should allow Customs access to that list.

After unloading containers, the shipping company should notify Customs of any cases where the integrity of containers seems to have been violated.

Shipping companies should examine their procedures for checking numbered seals and tamper-resistant cargo covers so as to prevent unauthorized access.

1.5 Security in the port or terminal when the shipping company is in control of services

- .1 The company should control access by private vehicles to cargo stores and loading services.
- .2 It should have a list of all vehicles and persons with regular authorized access to cargo stores and port services, and make this list available to Customs.
- .3 It should restrict parking of all vehicles to a designated area, remote from the active loading areas.
- .4 Any vehicle authorized to enter at one time to cargo stores or loading services must be issued with a dated entry pass and parking should be restricted to designated areas. The pass numbers should be recorded and made available to Customs if required.
- .5 When the shipping company has electronic security systems, such as closed-circuit television covering the cargo-holding or loading area, the systems must be accessible to Customs, if they so request.
- .6 Access to cargo and loading areas should only be permitted to authorized persons and vehicles showing the correct identification.

1.6 General security

Shipping companies should periodically carry out reviews of the control and security measures in their ports of call and take measures to remedy any defects identified or, when appropriate, report them to the port authority concerned. The review should focus specifically on those measures designed to restrict access of unauthorized persons to the vessel, services and cargoes.

Shipping companies should notify the Customs when employees discover suspect packages or unjustified cargoes on the ship or outside it. Suspect packages should be kept under observation while Customs are notified.

The shipping company should be ready to send warning signals to ships and loading services, with the description of internal sanctions applied to employees in confirmed cases of drug trafficking or abuse, with general reference to the severe penalties imposed by the competent authorities throughout the world for drug-related offences.

The shipping company should provide Customs with information on stevedoring companies which provide services to its ships in the respective ports, and identify companies which provide ship-related services.

The shipping company should, to the extent possible, take all precautions necessary, when recruiting new employees to work on their ships, to check that none of them has been convicted of drug trafficking or has a history of drug abuse.

1.7 Personnel security

The shipping company should allow only authorized and duly identified employees to handle operational information about the cargo or the ship.

Shipping companies should involve the proper customs authorities in educating its personnel in identifying areas where exceptions to normal commercial practice may suggest the possibility of a drug-related offence.

The relevant personnel of shipping companies should be trained to recognize signs that an employee may be likely to commit drug-related offences and in the measures to be taken when suspicion is aroused.

1.8 General

The shipping company should provide clearly identified and easily accessible local contact points for all matters shown to be of legal interest to Customs (cargo lists, passenger reservations, cargo routes, employee information, etc.).

Shipping companies should notify all employees or agents involved in ship or cargo operations, ashore and on board, of the content of these matters and give them instructions to carry them out in line with company policy.

Shipping companies should encourage constant and open exchange of information with the customs authorities (see annex 2).

Shipping companies and Customs, together with other bodies involved in commercial transactions, should regularly discuss matters of mutual interest, both locally and nationally.

Shipping companies should seek advice from Customs concerning the provision of suitable assistance and educational material, so that each company can:

- .1 help them to assess its vulnerability to use as a means of illicit drug trafficking;
- .2 develop specific plans to reduce its vulnerability; and
- .3 implement those plans.

Shipping companies should endeavour to educate their personnel, both ashore and on board, in the dangers of drug abuse and ways of identifying illicit substances.

2 The possibility of illicit loading on ships

The level of security necessary to prevent illicit drugs being concealed on board vessels clearly depends on the level and nature of the risk. Carriers need to assess the threat and identify their vulnerability.

Factors which need to be taken into account include:

- .1 ports of call and routes taken by the vessel;
- .2 the origin and routing of the cargo;
- .3 the level of control exercised at shore facilities;
- .4 the degree of control exercised regarding access to the ship; and
- .5 the vulnerability of the crew to pressure by drug traffickers.

Today's traffickers use a wide variety of routes, often transshipping the cargo several times until its country of origin is completely obscured. Few ports can now be considered safe from attempts to place drugs and other illicit substances on board, although ports in producing countries remain those in which the vessel is most at risk.

Ships are vulnerable to being used as a conduit for the movement of drugs:

- .1 in cars, freight vehicles, trailers, etc.;
- .2 by visitors to the vessel;
- .3 in luggage placed in a baggage trolley;
- .4 in ships' stores;
- .5 by contractors' personnel (for example repair or cleaning gangs);
- .6 as part of crew effects;
- .7 concealed on or in the vessel's machinery or hull;
- .8 in cargo or in the structure of cargo containers or packing.

In such cases, the trafficker may have the unwitting assistance of innocent people. Trafficking on commercial vessels can therefore be conducted by:

- 2.1 *Overt or covert entry and concealment of drugs within the ship***
The trafficker can board the ship, conceal a package and disembark before its discovery.
- 2.2 *Indirect entry and concealment of drugs within the ship***
The trafficker may use some convenient means of concealing and smuggling his illicit package on board (for example in cargo, its packing or containers, some item of passenger or crew baggage, in a carton of fresh provisions or in a box of machine spares). Such an exercise generally puts all the risk of detection on to an innocent third party.
- 2.3 *Conspiracy to insert and conceal drugs within the ship***
This will involve one or more members of the ships' crew or shore staff.
- 2.4 *Concealment of drugs on the outside of the ship***
Major drug movements can be carried out by a diver reaching the vessel's hull, either from another vessel or underwater, and securing a package to the ship's hull or to a main intake, a propeller bracket or a rudder fitting. Such attempts require considerable knowledge and technical skill and are only undertaken by the more sophisticated traffickers. This form of illicit trafficking is more likely in drug producing areas, which are also the areas of greatest risk.

3 Functions of operating companies in ship security

Overall responsibility for the security of a ship, and the people on it, rests with the operating company and the company's representative, the master. It is difficult for any organization to provide absolute security in every circumstance since commercial considerations, such as the need to continue operating and the cost of such security, have to be borne in mind. Security measures inevitably become a compromise between what is desirable and what is practicable in the circumstances.

Security measures, however, should relate directly to the level and nature of the risk of illicit drug trafficking in any particular location. The risk in the ports visited by ships needs to be reviewed regularly by both the company and the master, with the security measures being adjusted as appropriate.

Good security involves a readiness to accept that risks exist, perhaps involving employees, and that arrangements might be necessary to counter them.

Operators should consider:

3.1 *Education and training of the crew*

Although security is the responsibility of all crew members, they are likely to be more security conscious and vigilant if the principles of good security, and the risks of becoming involved in drug trafficking or abuse, are explained. A continuous and thorough training and education programme can support measures taken to safeguard ship security.

Ships' officers should have adequate knowledge of:

- .1 ship security plans and related emergency procedures;
- .2 the layout of the ship;
- .3 the assessment of the risk, threat and vulnerability;
- .4 port and ship operations;

and, if necessary, training in:

- .1 methods of conducting security inspections;
- .2 techniques used to circumvent security measures;
- .3 operation of technical aids to security, if used;
- .4 recognition of characteristics and behaviour patterns of persons who may be likely to commit unlawful acts;
- .5 the detection and recognition of illicit substances;
- .6 methods of physical searches of persons and their baggage.

3.2 *Liaison between local authorities and the operating company*

Good liaison with local customs, police and port authorities in regular ports of call is essential since it will provide local "intelligence", contacts and guidance, and assistance in all aspects of threat assessment.

3.3 *Awareness of the risk of illicit trafficking*

The threat of illicit drug trafficking in different ports of the world varies. The operating company therefore needs to consider the threat in relation to each port of call and make an assessment based on the best information available. The operating company's shore staff at each port should also be made aware of the risk and ways in which they can assist in combatting it.

3.4 *Review of ship security*

In the light of a carrier's assessment of the threat to its operations, a review of current security should be carried out, since this might reveal areas where additional measures are necessary. Such assessments should be discussed with customs and port authorities at both ends of the trade in which the vessel is engaged.

3.5 *Personnel available for ship security*

Company personnel, ashore and afloat, are vital to the operation of a good security system, whether or not they are directly employed in security functions.

Drug traffickers generally carry out a reconnaissance of potential smuggling opportunities for whatever type of operation they are planning. An unsecured vessel or cargo compound is more likely to be targeted than an obviously protected one and traffickers are deterred by visible security arrangements. A ship whose crew

is obviously vigilant is less likely to be selected as an innocent conduit for a drug run than one with a crew whose security procedures are neither extensive nor diligently enforced. It is therefore of great importance that security precautions are seen to be effective at all times.

The greatest deterrent to a potential trafficker is the obvious awareness of the threat by shore-based and seagoing staff.

3.6 Special care with cargo in containers

Operating companies are encouraged to co-operate with customs authorities in sharing information that may be valuable in the establishment of a "container-risk profile". A systematic analysis of criteria such as consignee companies, owners, source, market history, form of payment, ports of call, etc., may be valuable in establishing such profiles.

Remember

IF DRUGS ARE PREVENTED FROM GETTING ON BOARD THEY CANNOT BE UNWITTINGLY CARRIED. THE KEY ISSUE, THEREFORE, IS ACCESS CONTROL TO SHIP AND CARGO.

4 Measures and procedures for the ship's physical security

4.1 Shore facility security

Security measures and procedures reduce the vulnerability of any facility. The level of threat perceived by the national or port authorities will have a significant influence on the number and type of security measures and procedures adopted. The presence or absence of effective shore-side security measures is one of the main factors which determine the level of shipboard security.

The establishment of restricted areas on shore helps to control and channel access to vessel and cargo, improves security and increases efficiency by enabling the carrier to provide degrees of security compatible with the shore facility's operational requirements. The ability to control access to the storage and handling areas directly affects a carrier's ability to prevent the use of the vessel for the movement of drugs. Carriers have an opportunity to influence ship security through effective communication with the port authorities.

Wherever possible, ports should provide physical barriers against unauthorized access to cargo handling and storage areas. For the security of the ship, the following measures and procedures of shore facilities should be taken into account:

- .1 adequate lighting at entrances, cargo areas, along fences, in parking areas and in working areas to deter anyone from interfering with the cargo;
- .2 adequate fencing to make unauthorized access to the cargo difficult;
- .3 effective access control to berth and cargo areas and effective identification controls;
- .4 a security patrol in the cargo area able to communicate with the authorities;
- .5 a procedure for examining empty containers for structural alterations;
- .6 a procedure for examining customs seals to determine whether their integrity has been compromised;
- .7 a procedure for sealing empty containers;
- .8 a procedure for recording seal numbers and reporting broken seals;
- .9 control over the issue of seals;
- .10 a procedure for stacking containers to reduce unauthorized access to them;
- .11 adequate control of container stuffing operations;

- .12 a procedure for recording arrival and departure times and registration numbers of trucks entering and leaving the facility, and of names of drivers;
- .13 an identity check on cargo collectors;
- .14 a check on the adequacy and accuracy of documentation;
- .15 a procedure for cargo weighing and comparison with documentation.

4.2 Security on board ship

The master's traditional authority in matters of ship security remains paramount. Additional security measures should be implemented to counter increased risks when warranted. A properly trained crew is in itself a strong deterrent to breaches of security. The first line of defence is the maintenance of the integrity of the vessel. This could be seriously compromised if crew members or other company employees become involved in drug trafficking.

4.2.1 Control of access to the ship and identification

The main task facing a would-be trafficker aiming to conceal packages on board the vessel is to gain access by infiltration. Security measures aimed at prevention should therefore be introduced whenever the risk warrants it. In each case the best methods of deterring and preventing unauthorized access are crew awareness and control of entrance to the vessel.

The vessel's hull is a clear boundary which is easily defined. Protection of this boundary creates a physical and psychological deterrent to persons attempting unauthorized entry. It delays intrusion, enabling crew and security guards to detect and, if necessary, apprehend intruders. It also provides personnel and vehicles with designated and readily identifiable places for entry on to the vessel.

4.2.2 Precautions while ships are in port

Where appropriate and in order to adequately prevent drugs from being smuggled aboard, the following recommendations should be borne in mind by the crew of every ship:

- .1 all doors, hatches and means of access to holds or stores, which are not in use during the vessels stay in port, should be locked, under the supervision of the security guards;
- .2 at night, adequate lighting should be maintained both inside and along the hull. There should be sufficient security guards on board and adequate means of communication;
- .3 appropriate security and adequate means of communication should be maintained;
- .4 similarly, areas seawards of the ship should be adequately secured, to prevent small craft from approaching to load or unload illicit substances. The use of lighting, radar, night vision equipment, etc., might be considered;
- .5 no packets, bales or goods or postal packaging not duly protected by official documents and seals required for their shipment must be allowed aboard;
- .6 When required, cargo nets might need to be intercepted and opened on the main deck before being lowered into the hold, for purposes of inspection, since drugs components or precursors are often wrapped in the cargo nets so as to bring them aboard undetected.

4.2.3 Access by persons other than crew members

Owners and masters are encouraged to develop and implement procedures relating to access to the vessel.

Where persons other than crew members are permitted on board, the following precautions should be observed:

- .1 access may be authorized to specific departments but should not be granted to restricted areas, engine-rooms, holds, stores, etc.;
- .2 any package or bag brought on board or removed from the ship may be examined;

- .3 in the case of shore personnel working on board, for maintenance, loading, unloading, stowing or unstowing the ship, etc., masters should ensure that access to restricted and unauthorized areas is controlled;
- .4 access control at the ship's access ladder or gangway while in port.

4.3 General precautions in ships

The establishment of restricted areas on board ships (for example, bridge, engine-room, radio room, etc.) may also be considered. The locking of store-rooms, cabins and internal access points, unused while in port, is an obvious precaution. The use, number and distribution of ships' master keys should be controlled by the master. Corrective action should be planned in advance in case security should be compromised by misuse or loss of keys. The following measures might be considered for protecting the natural boundary created by the ship's hull.

- .1 Access points to the vessel should be kept to a minimum, ideally a single controlled gangway, ramp or companionway. When regulations demand a second emergency ladder, consideration should be given to keeping it rolled up or lifted clear of the water.
- .2 If the risk warrants it, access points should be manned. In certain circumstances two members of the crew or supplementary security staff may be required. They should be fully briefed on their duties and the action to take in the event of an incident or emergency. They need to be provided with a flashlight, a means of summoning assistance and communications equipment to remain in touch with the duty officer. A means of discreet communications by radio, direct-line facilities or other reliable means should be provided at each access point for use by security or operating personnel to contact the ship's security officer in the event that assistance is required.
- .3 Gangway duty personnel need to hold a list of crew members, shore officials and expected visitors. Security alarms and devices may be appropriate in certain ports, as a complement to guards and patrols. Immediate and appropriate response to alarms is important if they are to be effective.
- .4 Packages, spares and stores should be carefully scrutinized when being taken on board.
- .5 Random, frequent and thorough searches should be made if it is impractical to search every item. Items sent ashore for repair, inspection or replenishment, such as fire extinguishers, gas bottles, etc., should be closely examined on return to the vessel.

In areas of high risk visitors may need to be searched and photographed on boarding, accompanied whilst on board or even prohibited from entering the ship.

Shore facility employees, vendors, assigned law-enforcement officials and others, whose official duties require them to board the vessel, should be asked to identify themselves and prominently display suitable identification. Persons refusing to present security documents at an access point to the vessel should be denied entry and reported to appropriate shore-side authorities. If necessary, a responsible officer should be called to confirm their identity. Strangers should be challenged.

Unexpected visitors should only be allowed to embark one at a time and should be watched from the other side of the ship.

Vulnerable or little-used compartments and unmanned machinery spaces should be kept locked, especially in high-risk ports, and watchkeepers should make random inspections to look for signs of tampering. Consideration should also be given to removing identifying tallies over the doors of those compartments.

Crew members should be warned to be suspicious of unexpected objects or packages in unusual places. They should not accept packages from strangers and should be aware that drugs may be introduced into seemingly innocent packages.

To prevent this, boxes which have been searched could be bound with coloured tape for identification, or automatically strapped using polypropylene strapping tape.

Small craft in the vicinity of the vessel should be kept under surveillance and, at night, illuminated where possible.

At sea, if there is any doubt about the identity or intentions of a vessel which is seeking to attract attention, no reply should be given. Furthermore, when circumstances so warrant and safety permits, the ship should increase speed and/or extinguish navigation lights and increase deck lighting. Attempts should be made to identify or photograph any vessel behaving in a strange manner and the shore should be informed immediately by the fastest possible means. Particular care needs to be exercised in narrow waters and during the hours of darkness, when a surreptitious approach could be carried out more easily.

4.4 Measures to provide protection against external concealment

4.4.1 Lighting

While in port, at anchor or under way, the ship's deck and overside can be illuminated in periods of darkness and restricted visibility, though care should be taken not to interfere with the required navigation lights and safe navigation.

The lights should be arranged to illuminate specific areas continuously during the hours of darkness or restricted visibility. In some circumstances, it may be preferable to use such lighting systems only in response to an alarm.

Floodlights may be used to supplement the primary system and may be either portable or fixed. Where available, searchlights can be used to illuminate suspicious persons, vehicles or craft approaching the vessel.

4.4.2 Watch from on board

A good look-out should be kept from the deck, to look for bubbles (divers), floating refuse (which may hide swimmers) or small boats. Approaching boats should be challenged and, if unidentified, should be prevented from coming alongside.

4.4.3 Searches below the waterline

If it is thought likely that a device has been fixed to the outside of the hull below the waterline, a search can be carried out to locate the device, though not to dislodge it. Qualified clearance divers are required to do this and their assistance should be sought through the local authorities.

4.5 Personnel control

Passengers, crew members and other company employees having legitimate business on board vessels clearly have greater opportunity to circumvent access-control measures if determined to do so. Their potential for involvement in illicit activities must not be overlooked in assessing a vessel's vulnerability for use in the transport of drugs.

Where the threat warrants it, therefore, all reasonable and legal precautions should be taken to check the background and integrity of employees, especially prospective new staff. References from previous employers should be requested. Dismissals from previous employments or frequent job changes should be explained.

In assessing the possibility of employees succumbing to drug-related pressures, the following points should be considered:

- .1 Is there an anti-drugs commitment from management and are staff aware of it?
- .2 Is there a drugs awareness and education programme and is staff co-operation encouraged?
- .3 Do all employees entitled to access to vessels or cargo have identification badges?
- .4 Are all employees aware of what to do and whom to tell if a suspicious package is found?
- .5 Are all employees aware of what to do if they become suspicious of cargo, customers or colleagues?

- .6 Are any employees exhibiting signs of drug involvement, such as changes in appearance, behaviour or character, frequent requests for shift changes or a desire to be allocated to a particular vessel, consignment or work station?

4.6 *Forms of involvement of on-board personnel in drug trafficking*

Employees, crew members or passengers may become involved in drug trafficking either as individuals or as part of an organized conspiracy.

4.6.1 *Individually*

Experience indicates that officers and management are rarely involved in this kind of activity. Since access to the cargo at both loading and discharge is difficult to guarantee for a crew member – and even more so for a passenger – drug trafficking by individual carriers generally uses the personal or working area of the crew member involved. However, an effort may be made to conceal the goods in an area which will not immediately draw attention to the individual if the goods are discovered.

4.6.2 *The organized conspiracy*

Such conspiracies sometimes involve several or all crew members, including ships' officers and shore management. Other conspiracies can involve stevedores or container packers. With inside knowledge of vessel schedules, routeing, shipboard routines, cargo information systems and customs procedures, large quantities of drugs can be involved and concealment techniques can be highly sophisticated as there is time to prepare the hiding place and conceal the product. Other places of concealment which may require an organized conspiracy are fuel tanks, engine-room machinery, conduits or pipes.

5 *Detection of concealed drugs*

5.1 *Shipboard searches*

To help ensure maximum effectiveness, the search plan should be practised from time to time to build up confidence on the part of the crew and to remind them that good security is everyone's business. In areas of high risk or if specific information has been received, searches may be conducted after leaving each port. In these areas crews should be prepared to conduct a greater number of searches of people and goods.

Ships are particularly vulnerable to the transport of illicit substances. In the case of drugs, precursors and chemicals used in their manufacture, two main factors should be borne in mind:

- .1 the high value of the drugs, precursors and chemicals used in their manufacture and the involvement of international organized crime mean that large sums of money are at stake, with the consequent pressures including the risk of violence; and
- .2 the possibility that some crew members may be drug addicts.

Note:

All psychotropic substances are very dangerous and some can be absorbed through the skin. Gloves and masks should always be used when handling suspicious substances. Never rub, touch or handle substances with exposed skin. Do not inhale vapours or powder. Do not smoke near the substance in question. Do not test it. Do not taste, eat or drink it.

Everyone should bear in mind the possibility of sudden violence, including armed attack, when a large quantity of psychotropic substances, chemicals used in their manufacture or precursors are discovered. Due precautions should be taken at all times.

5.2 *Shipboard search planning*

To ensure that a thorough and efficient search is completed in the shortest possible time, search plans should be prepared in advance. This should normally be done by management in conjunction with the master and can be reviewed and modified in the light of experience.

The search plan should be comprehensive, and should detail the routes searchers should follow and all the places on the route where a package might be hidden.

The plan should be developed in a systematic manner to cover all options and to ensure no overlap or omission. This allows those responsible to concentrate on the actual search without worrying about missing something.

Before conducting the search, the configuration of the vessel should be taken into account to ensure that:

- the ship is divided into manageable areas
- all areas of the ship are included
- all areas of the ship are accessible.

This configuration would show:

- .1 number of decks;
- .2 number and location of cargo holds;
- .3 number and location of tanks and void spaces;
- .4 size and layout of engine-room;
- .5 number and size of crew quarters and public areas;
- .6 accessibility of ventilation systems.

One location on board needs to be designated as the control point where search team reports are sent, analysed and controlled.

Preparations should be made to equip the search teams with:

- .1 flashlights and batteries;
- .2 screwdrivers, wrenches and crowbars;
- .3 mirrors and probes;
- .4 gloves, hard hats, overalls and non-slip footwear;
- .5 plastic bags and envelopes for collection of evidence; and
- .6 forms on which to record activities and discoveries.

A system of check cards would be useful. One would be issued to each searcher specifying the route to follow and the areas to be searched. These cards can be colour-coded for different areas of responsibility, for example blue for deck, red for engine-room. On completion of individual search tasks, the cards are returned to a central control point. When all cards are returned, the search is known to be complete.

When the master has decided to search the ship, he should first brief his department heads who, in turn, can brief their own search group leaders. It is the group leaders who then organize their teams and search allocated spaces, using search plans to ensure that no spaces are missed.

5.3 *Types of shipboard search*

5.3.1 *Reactive search*

This type of search would be carried out in reaction to a specific threat or piece of intelligence indicating that a package has been placed on board. It can also be used as a precaution during times of heightened threat. A reactive search should comply with the following principles:

- .1 Crew members should not be allowed to search their own areas in case they are involved in a drug smuggling operation and have concealed packages in their own work or personal areas.

- .2 The search should be conducted according to a specific plan or schedule and must be carefully controlled.
- .3 Special consideration should be given to search parties working in pairs with one searching 'high' and one searching 'low'. If a suspicious object is found, one of the pair can remain on guard while the other reports the find.
- .4 Searchers should be able to recognize a suspicious package.
- .5 There should be a system for marking or recording 'clean' areas.
- .6 Searchers should maintain contact with the search controllers, perhaps by UHF/VHF radio.
- .7 Searchers should have clear guidance on what to do if a suspect package is found.
- .8 Searchers should bear in mind that smugglers may try to match the package to the background, such as a tool box in an engine-room.

The engine-rooms of ships are common places for concealing psychotropic substances, drug components or precursors. Generally shaft tunnels and lubricating oil and settling tanks are suspect, as are starting air bottles, the gauges of which can readily be set to show pressure even when empty. Access to the engine-room can be made from the shaft tunnel escape trunk opening on to the main deck or the steering engine flat. Once again it must be emphasized that such doors should be kept closed when the ship is in port and opened only in cases of need or emergency. Nevertheless, the need to keep escape routes clear must be observed.

The search controller should keep a record of all reports from the search groups to ensure that all spaces are checked and that the master always has an up-to-date search status.

The discovery of one package should not be the end of a search as there is always the possibility that more than one has been planted.

5.3.2 *Fast search*

Similar to the above search plan, a plan for fast search, or 'quick look', at the unlocked or more vulnerable and accessible areas can be drawn up for use after unloading/disembarkation and before loading/embarkation, etc. Using the card system, selected cards only are issued, covering the more vulnerable and accessible areas.

In this event:

- .1 all previously locked doors should be checked to ensure they have remained locked;
- .2 all unlocked spaces, lifts and rubbish bins should be thoroughly searched.

On completion of the fast search, the master can decide whether a full search, including a search of locked spaces, is necessary.

5.3.3 *Preventive search*

Preventive searching aims to deter smugglers from trying to smuggle a package on board a ship and to find such packages before they are planted. There may be occasions when all visitors to the ship need to be searched.

The point or points where people and goods pass into a restricted or sterile zone, such as the vessel, need to be established and controlled. At these points, checks and searches should be made to ensure that everything that passes through the point is clean. Once through the point, segregation is important and no contact should be allowed with uncleared personnel. The percentage of persons/goods searched will, of course, depend upon the threat level.

Passengers and their hand-carried baggage can be examined on shore, at one or more search points, or on boarding the vessel. As every port is different, final judgement must be made by local management.

No person or vehicle should be allowed to 'turn back' from a sterile area or depart the ship without the knowledge of the person controlling the search.

Restricted or sterile areas should be searched if they have been accessed.

The frequency of such searches will be determined by the threat level.

5.4 Methods of searching

The method of search chosen will depend on the individual situation and the level of threat. Physical search remains the final and most reliable method as long as it is correctly carried out.

5.4.1 Physical searching

Passengers and visitors to ships may be physically searched. With large numbers of people, this is best carried out in private booths, as this minimizes embarrassment and increases effectiveness. The use of private booths also prevents search methods from being observed. Passengers should not be given the opportunity of selecting a particular searcher and barriers should be used to prevent searchers being distracted by the large number of people around them.

A supervisor should observe visitors or passengers to note suspicious behaviour and to direct people to available searchers.

To be properly effective, a physical search of packages, bags and belongings should include a check for false bottoms, lids, sides and compartments. Very often a smell of glue or a heavy odour to mask the smell of certain drugs is an indication that a lining may have been removed and put back in position. Special attention should be paid to any tampering or repair to a package, greasy stains or small holes in the exterior. Contents should be assessed during the search and if the weight seems unbalanced or disproportionate for no obvious reason, a further check for a false compartment may be justified.

Particular attention should be paid to electrical and electronic apparatus, new as well as used, being brought on board. Passengers should be questioned on the origins of the equipment and whether it has been out of their possession for any period of time. Equipment may be examined for unusual characteristics such as signs of tampering, excessive weight or loose objects inside.

Other containers carried in bags which could be used to conceal drugs must also be examined. Normally this can be done visually.

5.4.2 X-ray systems

The most usual method of screening high volumes of baggage and personal belongings is to use X-ray equipment. Modern equipment is capable of producing images of good definition and penetration, but X-ray examination can be less effective than physical search in identifying drugs, although false compartments or hollow sections in goods, packaging or containers can be revealed.

Operator efficiency decreases significantly after only a relatively short time, particularly at peak screening periods, and operators should only scan X-ray images for a maximum of 20 minutes before being employed on other duties. The image must be presented for a minimum of 5 seconds to permit proper examination.

5.4.3 Ionscan

This is a highly advanced technology detection system recently used to detect concealed explosives and illicit drugs in security applications. The system uses the Ion Mobility Spectrum (IMS).

It is known commercially as Ionscan Model 400, is portable, gives a rapid response (5 to 10 s) is highly sensitive (pg and ng detection), can operate in a vacuum, requires little sample preparation and can be used for solids, liquids and gas.

Ionscan is used for drug detection by the FBI, the United States Coast Guard, and the authorities in France, Canada and the United Kingdom.

5.4.4 Use of dogs

Specially trained dogs can be very effective in searching cars, baggage and freight. Dogs can also be used for searching in ships but need to be familiar with the seagoing environment to achieve results.

5.4.5 Additional considerations

In addition to searches of people and accompanying packages, there may be occasions when searches of other items boarding the vessel may be necessary.

- .1 **Freight vehicles and trailers**
The searching of freight trailers before boarding is difficult and expensive, but there are times when such measures may need to be taken. In high-risk areas careful examination of paperwork and screening of drivers, coupled with reaction to good intelligence, contributes to solving the problem. Customs administrations should be consulted on this. As a last resort, trailers can be 'unstuffed' and physically searched using all methods mentioned above, including drug dogs.
- .2 **Other freight**
Freight consigned to cargo vessels may need to be checked on a random basis when the threat level warrants it. However, the screening of freight, especially containers, presents many problems. Even non-containerized cargo will be protected from damage by wooden crates and other forms of packing and the nature of some cargo, such as canisters or carboys containing chemicals, may make examination impossible.
- .3 **Ships' stores**
All ships' stores consigned to a ship offer a conduit for drugs. Ships must check their stores carefully and screen each item when the threat level so demands. The unexpected parcel is the one to be wary of.
- .4 **Miscellaneous deliveries to ships and ports**
Smugglers may well use innocent-looking vehicles and people delivering routine items such as bread, milk, flowers or fresh vegetables to contacts on board. Good access control, personnel identification and random search will help to counter this risk.

6 Concealment of drugs on board ships and tell-tale signs

6.1 On board ship

Drugs on board vessels can be hidden in the structure of the vessel itself or in seldom-used compartments, spaces and machinery, concealed in accommodation areas or, where crew members are involved, held on the person or in personal effects. The cargo offers many opportunities for concealment, especially where unit load or containerized cargo is involved.

6.2 Places of concealment on board ship

There are many places on board a ship where drugs can be concealed. Some of the more common places where drugs have been found include:

- .1 where it is unlikely that anyone will enter or where searches are rarely made, whether due to respect (for example master's cabin, the sofa in his day room), awkwardness (for example propeller shaft tunnel) or danger (for example behind electrical panels and in inert cargo spaces); near the funnel where fumes may disguise distinctive smells such as cannabis; passenger cabins;
- .2 store-rooms (flour bins, refrigerators, freezers for provisions such as fish and meat, sacks of vegetables or inside canned goods);
- .3 deposited provisions (wardrobes);
- .4 paint stores (paint lockers);

- .5 in crew quarters (for example behind or in radiators or toilet fittings, behind pictures or skirting boards, in porthole panelling, in cabin, ceiling and wall panelling, in false compartments in the bases of wardrobes and in coathangers, under lockers and drawers, beneath bunks and mattresses and other cabin furniture);
- .6 places where access is prohibited to unauthorized personnel;
- .7 inside lubricating oil tanks or cargo tanks; in companionway ducts, floor, wall and ceiling panels, inside ventilation pipes and shaft tunnels or cable ducts in the deck or inside engine-room machinery, in computer rooms, control panels, sumps, bilges and funnel shafts;
- .8 crates or containers with false bottoms; double-bottomed oil drums, cylinders and paint drums;
- .9 places where the substances may not seem out of place (for example medical stores, lifeboat stores); inside fire extinguishers, hoses and their storage spaces;
- .10 inside recent structural alterations; in freight containers or in hollow spaces in their construction;
- .11 inside false floors and/or ceilings in cabins and companionways;
- .12 in oil or water tanks (falsely calibrated gauges may be fitted).

6.3 *Suspicious circumstances on board*

The following are examples of circumstances which should be regarded as suspicious and warrant further investigation:

- .1 strangers found in unusual places while the ship is in port;
- .2 strangers carrying parcels and seeking access to the vessel;
- .3 shore gangs or contractors' staff working unsupervised on apparently unnecessary work or outside normal hours without good reason;
- .4 unanticipated work, especially structural adaptations or alterations (for example closed-off spaces);
- .5 crew members found in strange places without reason (for example, catering crew in the hold or engine-room), loitering in unusual places during the voyage or showing undue interest or unease during officers' inspections;
- .6 passengers found outside passenger or public areas;
- .7 unexpected occurrences (for example, a supposedly full ballast tank found empty) or things out of place (for example, sacks of flour in the paint store);
- .8 evidence that packages, tanks or containers have been opened;
- .9 disturbed stowage, closed-off spaces, pipes going nowhere;
- .10 missing keys;
- .11 unexplained failure of electrics or mechanics, for however short a period;
- .12 evidence of tampering with welded tank tops, primed gauges, insecure boat covers, unlocked 'secure places'.

6.4 *Suggested checks for masters and ships' officers*

- .1 know your crew's usual habits and study any unease or departure from routine, such as unusual places for routine jobs on board or any uncharacteristic behaviour;
- .2 maintain proper gangway watch at all times in port and forbid unauthorized access;
- .3 conduct regular inspections of varied nature, place and duration and log them;
- .4 question all strange persons in an unusual place on board while the ship is in port;

- .5 take into consideration the possible significance of finding things out of place; for example, a supposedly full ballast tank found empty, or sacks of flour in the paint store;
- .6 inspect all disturbed stowage, closed off spaces, pipes going nowhere;
- .7 seek evidence of tampering with the ship's fittings, for example, welded tank tops, insecure boat covers, equipment which does not work;
- .8 where possible, arrange supervision of shore gangs;
- .9 lock all spaces and access points to, for example, cargo spaces not regularly in use and control access to keys.

6.5 Observation of behaviour patterns

Crew members or passengers should be carefully observed as to their behaviour patterns. The following might be significant:

- .1 nervous or suspicious behaviour;
- .2 unusually large amounts of money;
- .3 unusually large local purchases;
- .4 expensive clothing;
- .5 lists containing names, dates or places and references to money, weights or other units;
- .6 unusual clothing when going ashore or returning to the vessel (for example, bulky or out-of-season clothing, conspicuous bulges on the body);
- .7 unusual interest in a particular area of the vessel, consignment or container;
- .8 possession of unusual tools not connected to the job;
- .9 possession of drug paraphernalia.

6.6 Suspicious circumstances at sea

In addition to being aware of the threats to their own vessel, crew members may, while undertaking their normal duties, become aware of unusual activities which may be worth reporting through the master to customs authorities. For example:

- .1 goods being transferred to and from vessels at sea;
- .2 goods being brought aboard from vessels close to shore;
- .3 marker buoys in unusual places;
- .4 signalling between vessels and the coast;
- .5 inflatables moving offshore at high speed (especially at night);
- .6 unusual diving activity in the port;
- .7 craft anchored or offloading goods on remote areas of coastline.

6.7 Suspicious circumstances on shore

Shipping companies should be aware of the drug trafficking threat and take it into account, whether or not:

- .1 the person making the cargo booking is familiar;
- .2 the shipper/consignee is a regular customer or a first-time client;
- .3 the article involved is consistent with the client's business;
- .4 the shippers'/consignees' addresses are incomplete, misspelt, vague or inappropriate;
- .5 the 'notify party' is difficult to contact;
- .6 it is a last-minute booking;

- .7 the charges are prepaid and in cash;
- .8 any attempt has been made to hide the name/address of the payer of freight;
- .9 the shipment originates in a known drug source or transit country;
- .10 the consignment appears to be normal bearing in mind the origin and routing of the cargo, commodity, country of origin and destination and the value of the goods;
- .11 the cargo is properly described on the documentation;
- .12 the size/weight ratio is commensurate with the commodity.

All staff should be aware of the threat and alert to any unusual circumstances. Any such circumstances, together with details of the ship and cargo, should be reported to the local Customs office.

Cargo-handling staff should be asked to look for:

- .1 broken seals on containers;
- .2 false floors in containers (not flush with the door frame) or false ceilings (roof above the corner blocks or changes in height of internal ceiling);
- .3 blocked cavities in the frame of containers or trailers;
- .4 evidence of drilling in the frame of a container or chassis;
- .5 evidence of fresh paint or new welding, or variations in wall, floor or ceiling texture, which may indicate a structural alteration designed to conceal drugs or other contraband.

Special attention should be paid to reefer boxes, where insulation spaces and material, as well as the machinery, offer additional smuggling opportunities.

7 Action when drugs are found

7.1 General guidance

In the absence of any specific standing company guidance, masters should seek directions on measures to be taken whenever drugs are discovered on vessels, in cargo or on premises. If drugs are found at sea, the authorities at the next port of call* should be notified by radio before entering territorial waters. Customs authorities should be informed as soon as possible.

7.2 Personal safety considerations

The following points should be observed to ensure personal safety when a suspected package or substance is discovered:

- .1 Do not pierce or open unrecognized suspicious packages wrapped in newspaper, foil, carbon paper, or polythene bags and sealed with masking tape.
- .2 Do not feel, handle or touch the substance without skin protection and a face mask.
- .3 Do not inhale powders, fumes or vapours.
- .4 Do not rush your actions.
- .5 Do not smoke near the substance or expose it to heat or flame.
- .6 Do not UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES taste, eat or drink the suspect substance.
- .7 Always wash hands and brush clothing free from any contamination as soon as possible.
- .8 Ensure adequate ventilation and lighting in confined or enclosed spaces.

* See annex 8 for appropriate contact addresses.

- .9 If moving the items to a secure place, wrap them in plastic film, sheet or bags and take them to a secure place or safe as quickly as possible.
- .10 Take note of anyone taking an unusual interest in what you are doing.

7.3 Specific guidance

Get another person to witness the position of a suspected package before taking any action. If possible, take photographs of the package as it was found, i.e. find a witness (avoiding the 'minder'). Handle as little as possible and remember there may be fingerprint evidence on the package. Where necessary, taking handling precautions, remove the goods to a safe place under lock and key. Guard if necessary. If at sea, record any discovery in the ship's log. Include as much detail as possible: date, time, location, approximate quantity, person detecting, names of witnesses, etc.

- .1 Do not disclose the find, and limit information to persons who need to know.
- .2 Notify the authorities at the next port of call before entering territorial waters. Failure to do so could result in charges of drug trafficking.
- .3 Do not allow crew members to disembark before being interviewed by the police or customs officers.
- .4 Protect any wrapping and anything else found in the space.
- .5 Consider searching similar locations and spaces.
- .6 Write a report AS SOON AFTER THE EVENT AS POSSIBLE. Include everything that occurred. Making a sketch plan of the space and area often proves helpful. It is also very useful to note why the particular location or cargo was inspected or how the package(s) came to be found. Include any suspicious activity noticed. The report should be signed by any witnesses. At sea, the finder, the witnessing officer and the master or head of department should sign the report, showing the date and time. If the finding is in cargo, the relevant cargo documentation should be collected for subsequent examination by customs authorities.
- .7 Ships' masters should notify the appropriate customs official upon arrival.

8 Medical substances permitted on board

8.1 Medical substances used on board

Most vessels today carry medical supplies for treatment of illness during the voyage as well as 'emergency' lifeboat medical stores. Vessels within territorial waters are subject to the provisions of the appropriate national legislation and any regulations relating to storage and supply of listed drugs will need to be observed. These are generally common rules based on international agreement.

The master of any vessel is responsible for the safe storage of drugs and security of the ship's medical locker, which is to be kept locked. Medical stores kept in lifeboats should be frequently inspected at sea and removed to the medical locker for security when the vessel is in port. If alternative arrangements are made, security must be adequate.

The vessel should provide a list, with quantities, of all controlled drugs (for example, morphine) to the customs authorities, together with the ship's report on arrival at a port. Providing the quantities carried are reasonable, no licence will generally be required.

Vessels such as cruise liners may carry a ship's doctor to whom those responsibilities can be delegated, but the master will still carry the legal responsibility for any irregularities.

8.2 Medical substances for trade

Drugs, irrespective of quantity, require a valid licence for import or export, although some minor relaxations may apply. The licence will specify the substances, period of validity of the licence, ports to be used and any special conditions concerning the shipment. Since any variation from the licence constitutes an offence, the local Customs should be approached if changes are required.

CHAPTER 2 – CONTROL OF THE TRANSPORT OF PRECURSORS AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS

1 Precursors and essential chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances

Drug producers, in addition to needing access to raw plant materials for processing into narcotic substances, also require access to large supplies of chemicals to enable the conversion to take place. Some drugs, known as synthetic drugs, are entirely chemically based. Two types of chemicals are required for the manufacture of other drugs or psychotropic substances: precursors, which are those which react to form part of the molecule of the final product (drugs or psychotropic substances), and essential chemicals, which assist in obtaining the product (such as solvents). Many of them are classified as controlled substances under the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Illicit Substances (see annex 1).

2 Precautions for the transport of precursors or essential chemicals used in the manufacture of narcotic drugs

Shipments of these products to drug producing areas are certain to generate interest on the part of customs officials, who are likely to investigate the consignment in greater detail. If any of the substances should be discovered on board unmanifested or in unusual circumstances, the customs authorities at the next port of call should be notified.

- .1 Both the master and the crew of a ship carrying essential chemicals or precursors used in the manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances should take security measures in respect of store-rooms and lockers where they are stored, including inspections to check the quantity and condition of the packages.
- .2 During its voyage, any ship carrying essential chemicals or precursors used in the manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances must inform the maritime authorities of the nearest port that it is carrying such substances, indicating the class, quantity, destination, route and itinerary.

3 Recommendations to countries which produce, distribute and supply essential chemicals or precursors

Bearing in mind that the manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances requires these chemicals, countries which produce such substances are requested to make special efforts to control their distribution and supply, through measures such as the following:

- .1 establishing government control of precursors so that the destination and means of distribution of these substances is known precisely;
- .2 designating specific ports for the loading and unloading of these substances;
- .3 submitting timely reports from the port of loading to the port of destination of ships carrying precursors, including description of the ship, route and itinerary, type of substances, quantities and intermediate ports of call;
- .4 encouraging ships carrying precursors to notify their port of destination and intermediate ports of call at least 24 hours in advance, so that the necessary control measures may be taken by each State.

Bearing in mind that essential chemicals used in the manufacture of drugs and psychotropic substances are of vital importance in a vast range of products quite unconnected with drug trafficking, it is considered important that each Government should emphasize the controls it deems appropriate to ensure that the specific quantities and qualities of those products reach their final legal destination.

Do not fail to assist if it is in your power to do so.

Annex 1

List of essential chemicals and precursors frequently used in the manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances

(under the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, signed in Vienna on 19 December 1988.)

Table 1

N-acetyl-anthranilic acid

Ephedrine

Ergometrine

Ergotamine

Isosafrole

Lysergic acid

3,4-Methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone

1-Phenyl-2-propanone

Piperonal

Pseudoephedrine

Safrole

The salts of the substances listed in this table whenever the existence of such salts is possible.

Table 2

Acetic anhydride

Acetone

Anthranilic acid

Ethyl ether

Hydrochloric acid*

Methyl ethyl ketone

Phenylacetic acid

Piperidine

Potassium permanganate

Sulphuric acid*

Toluene

Annex 2

The balance between enforcement and facilitation

In addition to interdicting attempts at smuggling, customs authorities also have a duty to facilitate the movement of cargo into and out of their country. These two requirements are potentially in conflict.

It must be recognized that, to customs officials, maritime transport offers the greatest potential for carrying large amounts of drugs. Due to the increased use of containers, it is more difficult for customs officials to examine cargo and, consequently, the possibilities of concealment have increased. No customs authority can conduct a physical search of all the cargo and the structure of even a small commercial vessel without a considerable allocation of resources and a delay to innocent cargoes.

Since the vast majority of international trade is entirely legitimate and untainted by attempts at smuggling, customs authorities must be able to detect suspicious cargoes, vessels, persons and organizations more effectively.

The International Chamber of Shipping has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Customs Co-operation Council to work together to identify ways by which carriers and customs authorities can provide mutual assistance concerning the conflicting objectives of "facilitation" and "enforcement". As a result of this commitment, guidelines were developed which set out a framework of co-operation between customs authorities and shipping companies at national and local levels.

The main aims of the guidelines are as follows:

- to promote carrier awareness of the problem.
- to increase co-operation between trade and Customs.
- to facilitate legitimate trade.
- to encourage an examination of trade security standards
- to encourage access-control measures.
- to allow Customs access to information.

All of this is done with a view to increasing the number of seizures of drugs in transit on commercial vessels, and to assist in the investigation and any subsequent prosecution of suspected offenders.

The general thrust of the new GATT agreement (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and the recent progress in establishing regional free trade areas are encouraging the abolition of barriers to trade between countries. However, the threat of drugs and other illicit products ensures that law-enforcement measures in ports of entry will continue. Innocent cargoes are inevitably subject to such controls. The partnership between international trade and customs administrations can go a long way towards restoring the balance between law enforcement and facilitation.

Annex 3

World seizures

The Customs Co-operation Council (CCC) maintains figures of drug seizures reported by national customs authorities.

Heroin seizures recorded in 1993 totalled 13,091 kg, substantially higher than the 1992 figure of 9,609 kg. Opium seizures rose 28% compared with the 1992 figure, to 4,408 kg. Cocaine seizures, though down slightly from the 1992 total, were four times the figure for 1986, at 94,861 kg.

Seizures of marijuana (herbal cannabis) and hashish (cannabis resin) are considerably greater in volume than those for the so-called 'hard' drugs, totalling 210,686 kg and 445,774 kg respectively in 1993. Though the figure for marijuana is well down from the 1.116 million kg seized in 1986, the decline is thought to be in part attributable to the greater concentration by responsible agencies on the interdiction of narcotic drugs.

The CCC also presents its figures by modes of transport. Those for 1991 (the most recent available) are as follows:

1991 Seizures – by mode of transport (kg)

	Land	Sea	Air	Post	Mode unreported	Total
Heroin	1867.0	692.7	2187.1	63.6	1043.8	5854.2
Opium	930.5	133.9	115.8	533.5	785.9	2499.6
Cocaine	31038.1	53689.8	18677.3	766.3	10847.7	115019.2
Marijuana	74785.9	52380.3	22708.2	1513.9	21932.4	173320.7
Hashish	112467.0	220540.0	3704.2	3401.1	235043.4	575155.7
Total	221088.5	327436.7	47392.6	6278.4	269653.2	871849.4
%	25.4	37.6	5.4	0.7	30.9	100%

In other words, more than 327 tonnes of illicit drugs were reportedly seized by customs authorities from maritime transport in 1991, and the figure has reputedly increased in more recent years.

* The salts of hydrochloric acid and sulphuric acid are specifically excluded from Table 2.

Annex 4

World trends

(based on the 1992 Report of the United Nations International Narcotics Control Board)

AFRICA

Consumption: Cannabis is the most widely used drug. Egypt is the largest consumer of cannabis resin, smuggled in from Lebanon.

An increase has been recorded in the consumption of cocaine and stimulants manufactured in India and Europe.

Transshipment: Large quantities of heroin and cannabis resin intended for other parts of the world have been seized in West African ports. Nigeria, Morocco and Tunisia are transit countries for Europe-bound cocaine from South America.

Production: The opium poppy is grown in Egypt, Kenya and Sudan. There are large plantations in many West African countries, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan and Zambia. Morocco continues to be a major source of cannabis resin.

EAST AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

Consumption: Cannabis is the most widely used substance in the region. There are significant markets in Hong Kong, Japan, the Philippines, Korea and the United States for methamphetamine produced in Taiwan. The main illicit substance of abuse in Malaysia and Singapore is heroin.

Transshipment: Cannabis is produced and moved throughout the region, as are opium, morphine, heroin, methamphetamine and chemical precursors. Bangkok, Singapore and the ports of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines are the main transit points for heroin *en route* to Europe, Australia and North America. Opium is shipped through Myanmar (Burma), Vietnam and Cambodia.

Production: The region is the main supplier of illicit heroin. Large quantities of opium are produced in Laos, Myanmar and, to a lesser extent, in Thailand. Cannabis from Laos, the Philippines and Thailand is smuggled into Australia, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, the United States and Europe. Taiwan is a major source of methamphetamine.

OCEANIA

Consumption: Cannabis continues to be the drug most readily available for consumption, although there is a good supply of highly pure cocaine and heroin.

Amphetamines are smuggled in, especially from the Philippines.

Transshipment: The area between Australia and the South Pacific Island States is used by maritime drug traffickers to tranship illicit consignments.

Production: Cannabis is grown in Australia and New Zealand, although some is also smuggled in. It is grown illicitly in Papua New Guinea to supply Australia and other markets.

SOUTHERN ASIA

Consumption: There has been a reported increase in intravenous heroin abuse in north-east India and, as a result, the level of HIV infection has increased, with 50% of heroin users reported to be HIV-positive in some Indian towns.

Transshipment: Bangladesh is increasingly being used as a transit country for illicit drugs.

Production: Illicit poppy cultivation is limited to the most remote areas of India. Most heroin shipments from the area are destined for Europe. India is a major source of methaqualone, most of which goes to Africa. A certain amount of cannabis and its derivatives are illegally exported from Sri Lanka.

NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

Consumption: Abuse of cannabis and its resin is very common, but the main problem is heroin and opium. Genuine and counterfeit stimulants are smuggled in from Europe, especially Bulgaria and, until recently, from the former Yugoslavia. Seconal tablets are smuggled into Saudi Arabia by African pilgrims.

Transshipment: New drug trafficking routes from Afghanistan to and through Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia have begun to emerge. Illicit drugs enter the region bound for Turkey, the main transit country for heroin from South-East Asia *en route* to western markets. Morphine is transported to south-east Turkey, where it is converted into heroin. The heroin traffic is organized by Istanbul-based criminal groups who play a major role in the transport and distribution of heroin in Europe. Lebanon is becoming a distribution centre for cocaine, mainly from Brazil.

Production: The region is an important producer of cannabis, cannabis resin, opium, morphine and heroin. Afghanistan produces some 900 tonnes of opium a year and there are reports that it is growing. The manufacture of illicit heroin in Afghanistan has also increased, although large quantities of opium continue to be processed in other countries in the region. Iran banned poppy cultivation in 1980. In Lebanon there are clandestine laboratories which convert coca paste into cocaine. North-west Pakistan is the source of large amounts of morphine and more than 70 tonnes per year of illicit heroin.

EUROPE

Consumption: Moroccan cannabis is the main drug of abuse in Europe, although smaller amounts arrive through the Balkans or by sea from South-West Asia. In some countries, attention is focused more on heroin and cocaine. Several countries have reported increased seizures of heroin, cannabis and South American cocaine, arriving via southern Europe and West and North Africa.

Transshipment: Heroin is reaching markets in Europe, mainly from South-West Asia and the near Middle East through Iran, Turkey and Bulgaria. Since the outbreak of fighting in the former Yugoslavia, a route through Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and the former Czech and Slovak Republics has been developed. Albania, Cyprus and Greece are important transit countries for heroin. Portugal and Spain continue to be important centres and major European points of entry for South American cocaine and North American cannabis. CIS States are used as transit points for consignments of cannabis resin from Afghanistan or Pakistan.

Production: Cocaine laboratories have been found in southern Europe. The Netherlands and Poland are major sources of LSD and amphetamines. There is evidence that legally manufactured pemoline is being diverted to illicit channels and smuggled into Africa. Cannabis is cultivated in the European CIS states, and grows wild in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. There are indications that the large-scale cultivation of cannabis under glass is being practised in the Netherlands, where up to 50% of the cannabis consumed may be 'home-grown'.

NORTH AMERICA

Consumption: In both the United States and Canada there are indications of an overall decline in the use of cannabis. However, there are currently more hard-core heroin and cocaine abusers than there were three years ago. LSD, illicitly manufactured in California, is smuggled into Canada. The area continues to be the major market for drug distribution.

Transshipment: A considerable amount of cocaine continues to pass through Mexico from South America.

Production: Mexico is a major producer of cannabis and, to some extent, opium poppies, with cannabis, heroin and methaqualone tablets being smuggled into the United States.

SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Consumption: In Argentina, Brazil and Chile the main drug of abuse is cannabis. There is some abuse of cocaine and psychotropic substances. In Venezuela, the abuse of drugs appears to be on the increase.

Transshipment: The ports of central and northern South America, and those of the Caribbean States, play a major and increasing role in the transshipment of cocaine to Europe and North America. The processing of coca leaves and cocaine trafficking are increasing in Brazil. The waters of the Caribbean island States, particularly the Bahamas, Cuba and Jamaica, are often used for dropping off illicit cocaine shipments from aircraft or ships, subsequently picked up by fast craft to be transported to the southern United States.

Production: Law-enforcement efforts have reduced coca bush cultivation, destroyed laboratories and seized large amounts of cocaine. However, almost all the countries in the region are used to convey or store illicit drugs, only a fraction of which is seized. Illicit poppy cultivation in Colombia has expanded. Peru is the largest producer of coca leaves. The growing of cannabis and coca bush, and the manufacture of cocaine, is spreading in Venezuela near the Colombian border. Belize and Costa Rica are producers of cannabis and transit ports. El Salvador is a transit country for cocaine.

Annex 5

Penal legislation

Colombia

Colombian Narcotics Statute 30/1986 authorizes the seizure of any vessel found to be carrying narcotics. Penalties may be reduced if the vessel reports any drugs on board.

Hong Kong

In 1982 a law was passed to the effect that any ship exceeding 250 gt could be arrested and detained if an excessive quantity of illicit drugs was found on board on two or more occasions within an 18-month period.

Iran

Traffickers convicted of possession of more than 30 g of heroin or 5 kg of opium face the death penalty.

Saudi Arabia

Convicted traffickers face long custodial sentences or death.

Singapore

There are severe custodial penalties and, in certain circumstances, the death penalty can be imposed.

Thailand

The death penalty can be imposed for persons involved in drug trafficking. The alternative is an extremely long custodial sentence.

United States

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 greatly increased the penalties which could be imposed against vessels found to have transported drugs to the USA. Penalties of US\$1000 per ounce for heroin and cocaine and US\$500 per ounce for marijuana and its derivatives were introduced.

Annex 6

Drugs and drug addiction

Drugs of abuse

A drug is defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) as 'any substance that, when taken into the living organism, may modify one or more of its functions.' Within this definition is a wide range of substances, some of which are both freely available and socially acceptable.

To give some examples:

- *Socially acceptable and freely available substances:*
Caffeine, tobacco (although increasingly becoming less socially acceptable), alcohol (in most countries)
- *Socially unacceptable and freely available substances:*
glue, methylated spirit, petrol, solvents, cleaning fluids.
- *Socially acceptable and freely available pharmaceuticals:*
aspirin, paracetamol, vitamin tablets.
- *Socially acceptable and controlled pharmaceuticals:*
barbiturates, valium, diazepam (librium), and numerous other prescription drugs.
- *Socially unacceptable and controlled pharmaceuticals or substances:*
cannabis, LSD, cocaine, morphine, heroin, amphetamines, opium.

Many of the substances in each category carry some risk of drug dependence, but those in the last category carry by far the greatest. Although some of the latter substances may be used under strictly controlled medical supervision, total dependence can still occur within a short period of time. When these drugs are abused (i.e. used in uncontrolled circumstances) addiction can result very rapidly.

Drug dependence can take various forms:

Physical addiction

This is defined by WHO as "a state that shows itself by physical disturbances when the amount of drug in the body is markedly reduced. The disturbances form a withdrawal or abstinence syndrome composed of somatic and mental symptoms and signs which are characteristic for each drug type."

In the case of physical addiction the body develops a craving for the drug. Withdrawal symptoms occur when the drug is withheld and some of the symptoms are physically visible in the form of excessive sweating, constant desire for liquids, scratching, twitching of muscles, irritability, diarrhoea, muscle spasm and in extreme cases, coma and death. Where physical addiction occurs, the body requires progressively larger doses of the drug to achieve the same level of intoxication or 'high'. The quicker this increase is noticed the higher the body tolerance is said to be.

Psychological addiction

"This is a condition in which the drug promotes a feeling of satisfaction and a drive to repeat the consumption of the drug in order to induce pleasure or avoid discomfort" (WHO 1974).

In this case the mind develops a dependence on the drug although there may be no physical dependence. Withdrawal symptoms are not as pronounced as in physical addiction but there may still be irritability, fits of anger, fixation on taking a further dosage, irrational behaviour, feelings of victimization, etc.

Environmental addiction

This can occur when the addict becomes accustomed to a particular lifestyle. Social meetings or meeting places, not just of opium or cannabis users, have been conducive to environmental addiction and provide opportunities for both addicts and 'pushers'. If drugs circulate in particular places, the addict has a permanent source and the 'pusher' a constant market.

The increasing incidence of the AIDS virus in many parts of the world has given new impetus to reducing drug abuse, since one of the main conduits for spreading infection is the use of contaminated hypodermic needles shared by drug users.

There are no social divisions or classes of drug users. They may be found in all walks of life and at all social levels. The physical characteristics of drug addicts depend on the type of drug used and the time that has elapsed since the last dose.

The drug user generally develops an ability to lie about his habit and keep it secret. Crew members may not notice a drug user among their colleagues.

In a closed community, such as exists in a ship's crew, there may be a strong bond of group loyalty which may result in an unwillingness to believe the worst about a colleague. Drug abusers and drug traffickers are aware of this and will, if suspicions are aroused, take advantage of this.

Drug characteristics and identification

The effect of drugs differs from person to person depending on the amount taken, the surroundings and the reactions of other people. There are certain behavioural tendencies which can be a useful guide to the identification of drug use.

Sophisticated forensic analysis is often required to establish the exact nature of any substance found. The following guidance may, however, help with tentative identification.

CANNABIS

Origin

Cannabis, the hemp plant (*Cannabis sativa*), is a bushy plant which grows wild throughout most of the tropical and temperate regions of the world, especially in the Middle East, south-west North America, South-East Asia and Mexico. It can be grown virtually anywhere in the world although the major 'commercial' movements generally originate in the West Indies, Africa, Turkey, the Indian sub-continent and Thailand.

The most important active ingredients are concentrated in the resin at the top of the plant. Hashish or 'hash' is resin scraped from the plant and compressed into blocks.

Although historically herbal cannabis has always been grown outdoors in regions with warm climates, it has become clear that growers in cooler climates are now producing high-quality cannabis indoors in climate-controlled conditions. Plants produced in this way are particularly rich in the active ingredient of cannabis (tetrahydrocannabinol or THC) and the product of such plants has a particularly pungent aroma which may account for its nickname 'skunk'.

Cannabis is the most common illicit drug. It can be found in three forms:

Herbal (marijuana)

This is found as a green, yellow or brown herbal material, rough or fine in texture depending on the grade of the sample and similar in appearance to dried stinging nettles or hay. Stalks, stems and twigs may be present as well as small white seeds. The substance smells of spicy damp earth and mild rotting vegetation. There is a noticeably acrid 'bonfire' smell when being smoked. The smell will linger in a non-ventilated environment.

Resin

This appears as beige to dark brown or black (occasionally with a yellowish or greenish tinge) and is normally found as slabs or small chunks, although occasionally in powdered form or moulded shapes. It is slightly sticky in texture. If it is in slabs or moulded blocks, these are normally 0.5 or 1 kg in weight with dimensions 130 mm × 100 mm × 25 mm (5 in × 4 in × 1 in) or 260 mm × 200 mm × 25 mm (10 in × 8 in × 1 in) respectively.

The slabs will usually be wrapped in polythene or linen. The substance can be moulded into various shapes such as the soles of shoes, beads, carved heads, etc.

Oil

This appears as a dark green to black, occasionally golden, viscous oily liquid and has a smell similar to herbal cannabis, but stronger. It is normally transported in glass or metal 5 litre or 1 gallon containers though they may sometimes be smaller. Cannabis oil dissolves polythene or plastic.

Smell

In general, all forms of cannabis have a spicy smell reminiscent of damp earth and rotting vegetation. It is likely to cause nausea where exposure is prolonged. The smell varies with the age of the sample, but is more noticeable in oil than in resin, which is itself stronger smelling than the herbal variety. The smell of the drug lingers in the clothing and the atmosphere where it has been smoked.

Administration

The herbal and resin forms of cannabis are usually smoked, but they may be eaten or chewed. In its oil form it can be absorbed through the skin or painted on cigarettes.

Associated equipment

Addicts use long cigarette papers, often several layers, small earthenware bowls, wood pipes or any wide-bored article such as animal horns, tree roots or water pipes, or crude cardboard tubes or filters – all designed to cool the temperature of the smoke. Commercial cigarettes may also be found with a line of oil ‘painted’ around them.

Special safety note: Cannabis oil can be absorbed through the skin and cause powerful hallucinations.

Degree of addiction

Psychological addiction:	fairly strong
Environmental addiction:	fairly strong
Physical addiction:	none
Body tolerance:	none to slight

Influence and symptoms

The most common effects are talkativeness, bouts of hilarity, relaxation, and a greater appreciation of sound and colour. The substances can induce drowsy and uninhibited behaviour with the addict exhibiting markedly slow reactions. There will be a marked inability to follow reasoned argument, the pupils of the eye will dilate, and the user will exhibit aggression when confronted.

With higher doses there may be perceptual distortion, and persons using the drug when anxious or depressed may find their feelings magnified. For people with disturbed personalities, heavy use can precipitate a temporary psychotic disorder.

Popular myths

<i>Fiction:</i>	Cannabis is an aphrodisiac.
<i>Fact:</i>	The drug reduces sperm count and fertility.

Fiction: It is harmless.

Fact: The drug is stored in the brain and lowers the intelligence rating. It is also carcinogenic.

Quantities of shipment

Generally 25 kg to 5000 kg. Most shipments of cannabis and its derivatives have been found on ocean-going vessels.

OPIATES AND OPIOIDS

Origin

Opiates are drugs derived from the opium poppy. Opium is the dried 'milk' of the poppy and contains morphine and codeine. From morphine it is not difficult to produce heroin, which is, in its pure form, a white powder over twice as potent as morphine. Opiates have medical uses as pain-killers, cough suppressants and anti-diarrhoea treatments.

The main sources of supply for illicit opium and its derivatives, morphine and heroin, are the poppy fields of the so-called 'Golden Triangle' area of Burma, Thailand and Laos in South-East Asia and the 'Kabul Triangle' or 'Golden Crescent' area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran in South-West Asia. It is produced in smaller quantities in other areas of the Eastern Mediterranean through to South-East Asia. Most likely ports of origin, based on past seizures, are Bangkok, Singapore, Penang, Port Klang, Bombay, Calcutta, Karachi and Kota Kinabalu. However, most other ports within the area of production have been used by drug traffickers.

Both morphine and heroin are chemically derived from opium. Opium is converted into morphine in a relatively simple chemical process that usually takes place in a makeshift laboratory near the poppy fields. It takes about 10 kg of opium to produce 1 kg of morphine and 3 kg of morphine to produce 1 kg of heroin (i.e. 30 kg of opium to produce 1 kg of heroin). 'Heroin' is a name commonly used to describe a preparation containing diacetylmorphine base or its salts. It is a semi-synthetic product derived from the complete acetylation of morphine base.

Opiates may appear in various forms:

Raw opium

Raw opium starts as a thick, dark brown or almost black sticky substance, hardens to the consistency of liquorice and then, with time, to a hard brown/black slightly sticky mass like sealing wax, depending on its age.

Care is usually taken to ensure that it does not dry out since it loses much of its value if it becomes hard and brittle. In its raw state opium cannot be smoked. It is smoked only after conversion into prepared opium. Raw opium is unlikely to have identification marks. It may be wrapped in cellophane or polythene inside waterproof paper in order to stop the raw opium drying out. Polythene or cellophane bags have been found inside tins or wrapped in sacking or sailcloth.

Raw opium has a sweet, oily, pungent aroma, reminiscent of hay. It is not an unpleasant smell from a distance, but is sickly and nauseous when close up or in a confined space without ventilation. Its method of packing is designed to reduce the chance of detection by smell.

Prepared opium

This is produced by treating raw opium with various methods of water extraction, filtration and evaporation to obtain a product suitable for smoking. It usually appears as a black, brittle mass or parings and may smell faintly sickly like raw opium.

Opium dross

This is the substance remaining in the pipe after smoking. Due to incomplete combustion and volatilization, it can retain some characteristics of opium and contain a considerable amount of morphine. It will have a charred appearance and the smell of opium will linger in the air long after smoking.

Medicinal opium

Medicinal or powdered opium is opium that has been dried at moderate temperatures and reduced to a fine powder, usually light brown in colour. It has the characteristic smell of opium, though this may be disguised by additives such as camphor. The product can be used in medicines, any of which are classed a medicinal opium if they have a morphine content greater than 0.1%.

Morphine

Morphine is chemically derived from opium. In its pure form it consists of white crystals. It is often adulterated and its colour may range from white, cream or beige to a dark coffee colour. It is also found in a medical injection form as a colourless liquid in ampoules. Both pills and ampoules may be commercially produced. In this form it may smell faintly of ammonia or rotting fish.

Diamorphine (heroin)

Diamorphine is a further distillation of morphine. Generally similar to face powder in appearance, it is perhaps slightly coarser, and cream to light brown in colour. It is generally odourless but may have a faint vinegary smell. The substance may be commercially produced in pill, capsule or ampoule form. It is more popular with addicts than morphine since it gives a quicker and more intense 'high'.

Synthetics: for example pethidine

These normally appear in pill or ampoule form. The pills, which are odourless, are often white but may vary in colour.

Semi-synthetics: for example Dilaudid, Omnipon

These usually appear as odourless pills or ampoules.

Codeine

This is usually found as white tablets or pills

Administration

Opium and its derivatives are smoked, inhaled or injected through the skin (subcutaneously) or directly into the bloodstream (intravenously).

Associated equipment

This may consist of pipes, porcelain bowls, skewers, small peanut-oil lamps, rags, charred silver foil, matchbox covers, hypodermic needles, eye droppers, etc. Possession of opium utensils is in itself an offence in many countries.

Notes:

- Identification of pills and capsules is possible by reference to manufacturers' charts. Information such as the diameter of the pill or tablet, its colour, its shape and any markings or scoring on the surface can often be radioed ahead and a tentative identification requested.
- Ships' supplies of opium, in all its forms except raw and prepared, are generally permitted in small quantities under the control of the master or ship's doctor.

Special safety note: Narcotic fumes are generated at about 40°C. If found, opium or its derivatives should be stored in a cool place. The fumes or vapours should not be inhaled.

Degree of addiction

Psychological addiction: strong

Environmental addiction: strong

Physical addiction: strong

Body tolerance: high

Influence and symptoms

Moderate doses of pure opiates produce a range of generally mild physical effects (apart from analgesia). Like sedatives, they depress nervous system activity, including reflex functions such as coughing, respiration and heart rate. They also dilate blood vessels, giving a feeling of warmth, and depress bowel activity, resulting in constipation.

Immediately after taking the drug the user's eyes will become constricted. Subsequently the pupils will dilate and the drug will induce a drowsy torpid state in the addict, with dilated pupils, constipation and a slow response to stimuli. Symptoms similar to influenza or malaria but longer lasting will appear if the drug is withdrawn. In the longer term, loss of appetite and general apathy will result in the addict becoming emaciated and in poor health with poor hygiene.

There will be needle marks on the addicts' veins.

The addict generally uses around 0.25 g per day.

Popular myths

Fiction: The high purity of black-market opiates is guaranteed.

Fact: Purity at street level is usually 5–10%. Sugar, brick dust, caffeine, cement, milk powder, urine, powdered glass, etc. are known adulterants to so-called "pure smack" (diamorphine).

Fiction: It is easy to be cured.

Fact: Research shows that, of treated addicts, 10% have stayed off for more than 6 months but only 2% or 3% for more than 2 years.

Fiction: The substance is not really dangerous.

Fact: The average life expectancy of a heroin or morphine addict is about 6–8 years. Some can survive much longer. Many die within 4–5 years. AIDS can be transmitted by using infected needles or syringes.

Quantities of shipment

Usually from 5 kg to 75 kg.

COCAINE

Origin

Cocaine is derived from the leaves of the Andean coca shrub and has powerful stimulant properties similar to those of amphetamine. It is produced mainly in the northern half of South America, especially Colombia and Venezuela, where cocaine profits are a major influence on the economy. The main problem facing the producers is transporting the substance to consumption areas.

It is moved in three forms: coca leaf, coca paste and cocaine.

Coca leaf

This appears as an elliptical leaf, greenish brown to red in colour, similar to large bay leaves in appearance, usually dried. It is odourless.

Coca paste

This appears as a white to off-white or creamy coloured putty-like substance. It has a strong chemical odour, rather like linseed oil.

Cocaine

This appears as a fluffy white crystalline powder which glistens like snow, though occasionally transported as a colourless solution. It is odourless.

'Crack'

'Crack' emerged as the 'in' drug in the early 1980s, initially in the United States. Its use has now spread to other countries. It is produced by mixing cocaine hydrochloride with baking soda or ammonia and/or amphetamine powder. Water is then added to form a paste which is heated and dried. After drying, the 'crack' is broken into small pieces.

Being an adulteration of pure cocaine, 'crack' is unlikely to be shipped in large quantities since it is bulkier than the pure form of cocaine.

Administration

The substance can be inhaled, injected or rubbed into gums, genitals or the anus. Regular users with sufficient supplies (and wealth) might consume 1–2 grams a day. 'Crack' can also be smoked through a heated glass pipe.

Associated equipment

Equipment consists of hypodermic syringes, needles, eye-droppers, snuff spoons, razor blades, mirrors, fancy phials or pill boxes, straws etc. The "sniffing" paraphernalia can be antique or expensive metal tubes encrusted with precious stones worn as ornaments. Less wealthy addicts use plastic spoons, straws, empty ball-point-pen refills, etc.

Degree of addiction

Psychological addiction: strong

Environmental addiction: strong

Physical addiction: none to slight

Body tolerance: slight

Influence and symptoms

Like an amphetamine, cocaine produces psychological arousal accompanied by exhilaration, decreased hunger, indifference to pain and fatigue and feelings of great strength and mental capacity. Users will exhibit pinpoint pupils and suffer from a highly excitable state and erratic behaviour. They will be talkative and may have an increased heart rate and respiration. Repeated doses over a short period of time can lead to an extreme state of agitation, anxiety, paranoia and perhaps hallucination.

When sniffed, the physical effects peak after about 15–30 minutes and then diminish. The after-effects will include fatigue and depression. This means that the dose may have to be repeated every 20 minutes or so to maintain the effect. Withdrawal symptoms include depression, anxiety for another dosage and feelings of victimization.

The physical signs of abuse include injection marks, abscesses on gums etc, running nose, sniffing and streaming eyes.

The symptoms of 'crack' are an immediate 'high' lasting approximately 30 minutes followed by intense depression. The user can become psychotic, violent, paranoid and extremely confused. The physical effects are brain seizure, loss of consciousness and lung damage.

Popular myths

- Fiction:* It is not physically addictive like heroin.
- Fact:* True. But it is addictive mentally and can damage the membranes lining the nose and also the structure separating the nostrils. The addict can be easily overdosed and purities vary from the usual 30% to about 90% from source to source.
- Fiction:* It does not do any real harm.
- Fact:* AIDS has been commonly transmitted by contaminated needles or syringes. There is no known cure for AIDS.

Quantities of shipment

Usually from 5 kg to 75 kg.

HALLUCINOGENS

Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD)

LSD is a synthetic white powder which can be formed into crude pills or shapes. It is also found as impregnated papers the size of postage stamps, often with mystic signs, or sheets of cartoon characters or miniature pictures. It is a pale or colourless solution in its pure form.

Mescaline

This appears either as black to brown buttons with white, thready fungus often present or as a black ground powder.

Psilocin/Psilobycin

This is found as a pale pink or yellow liquid and in pill or tablet form.

DMT

This comes either as small black seeds, or as a finely ground black/brown powder.

Bufotenine

Bufotenine is odourless and is usually found as tablets or in liquid form.

Synthetics

These are found in powder, crude pill or tablet form, or as colourless liquids.

Smell

All forms are odourless.

Administration

This can be by eating, sniffing, injecting, smoking (occasionally), handling or by rubbing into gums, genitals or anus.

Associated equipment

This may include silver foil wrappings or photographic paper (LSD degenerates in daylight). Clear gelatine capsules may also be found. Small quantities are usually involved (10 micrograms can cause toxicity if absorbed through the skin). Hallucinogens will be carefully wrapped for transport.

Special safety note: Minute quantities will cause toxicity (from 10 micrograms in the case of LSD, 6 to 60 milligrams in other types). Some forms are readily absorbed through the skin. The utmost care must therefore be used when handling.

Degree of addiction

Psychological addiction: strong

Environmental addiction: fairly strong

Physical addiction: none

Body tolerance: none to slight

Influence and symptoms

These will vary according to the drug. There will be highly irrational behaviour and the user may be oblivious to outside stimuli, perhaps covering, voluble or convinced of superhuman ability (e.g., flying, floating, great strength). The user may run amok with apparent schizophrenia and insane behaviour. There may be periods of lucidity and instances of 'flashback'.

Popular myths

Fiction: Good 'trips' bring you into contact with God, the Universe, Nature, etc.

Fact: More often the 'trips' are bad and permanently scar the personality.

Quantities of shipment

Not usually found in commercial quantities in maritime freight.

STIMULANT DRUGS

Among the main stimulants are amphetamine salts and sulphate, phenmetrazine, benzphetamine, chlorphentamine, fencamfamine, mephentamine, methylenedioxymphetamine (MDA), pemoline, phenmetrazine, phentermine, pipradol and prolintane.

Description

Amphetamine products, legally manufactured, contain the drug in the form of the sulphate or phosphate salt. They are marketed in different countries as tablets, capsules, syrups or elixirs. In pure form all are white powders except pipradol, which is found as white crystals. There are many hundreds of brand names. They are usually found in pill or tablet form or as capsules, but occasionally in ampoules for injection.

All are stimulant drugs, but fencamfamine has been decontrolled to prescription availability. Identification of individual pills and capsules is possible by consulting manufacturers' charts. Information such as the diameter of pill or tablet, colour, shape and markings can be radioed from the ship to the next port of call to obtain a tentative identification.

Illicit products vary in colour from a white or off-white powder to yellow or brown depending on the type and amount of impurities and adulterants. They are often damp, with a characteristic unpleasant odour due to the presence of solvent residues. They can be found as small gelatin capsules and as tablets.

All discoveries of apparently medical preparations outside their normal context should be regarded as suspicious.

Smell

All are normally odourless. Pure forms of amphetamine may smell faintly ammoniac or "fishy".

Administration

Pills are usually taken orally or as a powder either sniffed, smoked or dissolved in water and injected. They are frequently taken in association with alcohol. Dosages of 200 tablets a day are common among addicts.

Associated equipment

Usually none, except empty wrappings. Occasionally hypodermic syringes and needles.

Degree of addiction

Psychological addiction: strong

Environmental addiction: fairly strong

Physical addiction: none

Body tolerance: high

Influence and symptoms

Amphetamines arouse and activate the user much as the body's natural adrenalin does. Breathing and heart rate speed up, the user will exhibit dilated pupils and a depressed appetite. The user feels more energetic, confident, excited and cheerful and will exhibit erratic behaviour and extreme sociability.

High doses can produce delirium, panic, hallucination and a feeling of persecution which, in the longer term, can develop into a psychotic state from which it can take several months to recover. Regular users of high dosages also risk damaged blood-vessels or heart failure.

As the body's energy stores become depleted, the predominant feelings may become anxiety, irritability and restlessness and hunger.

Popular myths

Fiction: They are totally harmless. They just pep you up.

Fact: Instances of renal failure have been reported and these substances are known to affect other internal organs.

Fiction: They are all different.

Fact: Each of the types has many hundreds of brands. Often the addict will swear that only 'Purple Hearts' will work whereas 'Peaches' will not. Both contain the same quantity of the same drug. Only the colour and the presentation are different.

Quantities of shipment

Not usually found in commercial quantities in maritime freight.

SEDATIVE DRUGS

Sedatives depress the nervous system in the same way as alcohol, producing similar effects. They come in two forms: barbiturates and methaqualone.

In their pure form all are white powders. There are many hundreds of brand names when the substances are found as pills, tablets and capsules.

All discoveries of apparent medical preparations outside their normal context should be regarded as suspicious.

Smell

All forms are normally odourless.

Administration

Pills are usually taken orally, sometimes with alcohol. Occasionally the substances may be injected.

Associated equipment

Usually none, except empty wrappings. Occasionally hypodermic syringes and needles.

Note:

There are many other forms of sedative which are available on prescription. Although the above forms are controlled, numerous other sedatives can be equally abused (for example diazepam, marketed as Librium, etc.).

Degree of addiction

Psychological addiction: strong

Environmental addiction: fairly strong

Physical addiction: fairly strong

Body tolerance: fairly strong

Influence and symptoms

The user will exhibit dilated pupils, drowsy appearance and slurred speech. There can be extreme unpredictable emotional reactions and mental confusion. Large doses can produce unconsciousness, eventual respiratory failure and death.

Popular myths

Fiction: Not a dangerous drug, easy to get hold of, cheaper than the hard drugs.

Fact: It is easily overdosed. Where prescription control exists, each illicit tablet may cost many times the 'white' market price.

Annex 7

Glossary

Commercial carrier means any person or any public, private or other entity engaged in transporting persons, goods or mails for remuneration, hire or any other benefit.

Confiscation, which includes forfeiture where applicable, means the permanent deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent authority.

'Freezing' or 'seizure' means temporarily prohibiting the transfer, conversion, disposition or movement of property on the basis of an order issued by a court or a competent authority.

Transit State means a State through the territory of which illicit narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and other substances are being moved, which is neither the place of origin nor the place of ultimate destination thereof.

Annex 8

List of contact points in ports for reporting drug-related incidents

EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE – Poland

Contact location – Warsaw
Responsible officer – Mr. M. Lubik
Polish Central Board of Customs
Pl. Powstancow W-wy, 1
PL 00950 Warsaw
tel: 48 2 621 4041
fax: 48 22 471 552

CARIBBEAN – Puerto Rico

Contact location – San Juan
Responsible officer – Mr. J-C. Garric
WCO/CCLEC J.I.O.
US Coast Guard Base
PO Box 2029
San Juan, Puerto Rico
tel: 1 809 729 7695
fax: 1 809 729 7699

SOUTH AMERICA – Chile

Contact location – Valparaiso
Responsible officer – Mr. F. Gonzalez
Direccion Nacional de aduanas
Plaza Sotomayor, 60
Valparaiso
tel: 56 32 253 682
fax: 56 32 233 163

NORTH AFRICA – Morocco

Contact location – Casablanca
Responsible officer – Mr. S. Zniber
Direction générale des douanes et impôts indirects
1 Place Mohammed V
Casablanca
tel: 212 2 273 855
fax: 212 2 272017

WEST AFRICA – Senegal

Contact location – Dakar
Responsible officer – Mr. Y. Cisse
Avenue Carde Angle Rue Ndiaye
B.P. 4033
Dakar
tel: 221 221185
fax: 221 211184 or 225569

CENTRAL AFRICA – Cameroon

Contact location – Douala
Responsible officer – Mr. J. Drouet
Direction nationale des douanes
B.P. 4049
Douala
tel: 232 431 701
fax: 232 431 701

WEST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA – Kenya

Contact location – Nairobi
Responsible officer – Mr. J.K. Nzuva
Assistant Commissioner
Investigations Branch
Kenya Customs & Excise Department
PO Box 72 736
Nairobi
tel: 254 2 710525
fax: 254 2 715744

MIDDLE EAST – Saudi Arabia

Contact location – Riyadh
Responsible officer – Mr. A. Al-Orf
Customs Department
PO Box 22 631
Riyadh
tel: 966 1 478 7889
fax: 966 1 478 5887

ASIA/PACIFIC – Hong Kong, China

Contact location – Hong Kong, China
Responsible officer – Mr. Wing Yiu MAN
Investigations Division
Hong Kong Customs & Excise Department
Rumsey Street, Multi-storey Car Park Bldg
Hong Kong
tel: 852 2852 1449
fax: 852 254 44731